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Abstract -- Firewalls are a well established security
mechanism for providing access control and auditing
at the borders between different administrative net-
work domains. Their basic architecture, techniques
and operation modes did not change fundamentally
during the last years.
On the other side new challenges emerge rapidly
when new innovative application domains have to be
supported. IP-Telephony applications are considered
to have a huge economic potential in the near future.
For their widespread acceptance and thereby their
economic success they must cope with established
security policies. Existing firewalls face immense
problems here, if they - as it still happens quite often -
try to handle the new challenges in a way they did
with “traditional applications”. As we will show in
this paper, IP-Telephony applications differ from
those in many aspects, which makes such an approach
quite inadequate.
After identifying and characterizing the problems
we therefore describe and evaluate a more appropri-
ate approach. The feasibility of our architecture will
be shown. It forms the basis of a prototype implemen-
tation, that we are currently working on.
I. INTRODUCTION
A.  IP-Telephony
IP-Telephony is used to establish a conversation com-
parable to a classic telephone call using an IP infrastruc-
ture. Typical applications and scenarios are currently
based on different protocol suites. At the moment there
are two main approaches - the H.323 [1] protocol family
and the Session Initiation Protocol SIP [2] with a chang-
ing distribution and relevance. Though today, a high per-
centage of applications and scenarios is still H.323 based
(and we will therefore initially focus on it), it is supposed
that in the near future the use of the SIP protocol may
increase [3]. Both protocol types will even be usable
together with appropriate gateways.
B.  Firewalls
Within a global networked environment, security as-
pects have become more and more important and access
control at network borders is considered essential. There-
fore, most organizations replaced their simple internet
routers by firewalls.
These firewalls consist of packet filters, “stateful fil-
ters”, proxies or a combination of all these. A firewall
examines all network traffic between the connected net-
works. Only packets that are explicitly allowed to (as
specified by a security policy) are able to pass through
[4],[5]. In addition to the inspection of data flows, some
firewalls also hide the internal network structure of an
organization. From the Internet the only visible and
therefore attackable network system is the firewall. This
is achieved by the use of proxy functionality or a Net-
work Address Translation (NAT) mechanism.
To perform its observation tasks the firewall compo-
nents (filters, stateful filters, proxies) need to interoperate
with a special component for the services (e.g. IP-Tele-
phony) they want to support. We refer to this component
as a parser. Based on the analysis of the traffic, the fire-
wall decides whether packets may be passed through. A
parser may also interact with NAT or proxy components
since it extracts the information that can be modified or
used.
II. PROBLEM DOMAIN
A.  Multimedia Applications
The type of applications considered here are multime-
dia applications which use continuous (e.g. audio, video)
and discrete media (control, text, meta data) data [6].
Multimedia applications significantly differ from tradi-
tional applications.
Especially
• multiple flows for one logical session,
• complex protocols and dynamic protocol behavior,
• high data rate and other QoS constraints,
• the usage of multicast mechanisms
are common features and may cause problems in a net-
work environment which is protected by firewalls.
A comprehensive description and general approaches
to deal with these characteristics can be found in [7],[8],
[9],[10] and [11]. In this paper we intentionally focus on
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IP-Telephony related topics.
B.  Specific IP-Telephony related characteristics
Figure 1 describes a scenario in which H.323 compo-
nents and firewalls are used together. It is considered to
be representative for common operational areas and may
slightly be adapted to individual other configurations.
The figure shows a private intranet of an organization,
protected against the public Internet by a firewall. Within
the intranet one or even more H.323 zones may exist. A
H.323 zone consists of a gatekeeper and several optional
devices such as a Multi Conference Unit (MCU), gate-
ways and terminals.
1) Variety and complexity of communication mechanisms
The communication mechanisms used in the scenario
depend on the involved components and may differ for
different use cases. If only two terminals (Terminal A and
C) establish a H.323 connection, the following basic
order of events proceeds:
• Q.931 (TCP) signaling:
Terminal A contacts Terminal C via TCP. The TCP
connection is used by Q.931 to set up the call and to
negotiate the parameters (e.g. ports) for the following
H.245 connection.
• H.245 (TCP) signaling:
Terminal A contacts Terminal C via TCP using the
negotiated port. The H.245 connection is used to
determine the characteristics of the following media
streams (e.g. audio or video).
• RTP/RTCP (UDP) media and control traffic:
Several streams may be used between the two termi-
nals. At least 4 UDP streams are necessary to trans-
mit audio (1 RTP and the corresponding RTCP
stream in each direction). Additional streams could
be used if also video has to be transmitted.
If, in the same scenario, a gatekeeper is used, the com-
munication mechanisms differ. In this case we observe:
• RAS registration (TCP):
At system start up the terminals use a TCP connec-
tion to register themselves at the gatekeeper using the
Registration, Admission and Status (RAS) protocol.
• RAS Admission Control (TCP):
Before the communication can be set up between
both terminals, the calling terminal (Terminal A)
requests a permission at the gatekeeper using the
RAS protocol. If this permission is granted, the com-
munication setup proceeds incorporating the steps
(Q.931, H.245, RTP/RTCP) described above.
The communication mechanisms also change, if other
devices like MCU or gateways are used.
2) Vendor specific implementations / features
Not only the use of other components within the sce-
nario has major implications. Our experiments show, that
different vendors also use different (and sometimes not
interoperable) implementations, though they claim to be
fully H.323 compliant.
In case the Terminal A is not a “pure” H.323 terminal
but implements Microsoft Netmeeting the following
extension will be used (and some firewall solutions rely
on it):
• ILS/LDAP (TCP) name / address resolution:
Before the communication is set up, Terminal A tries
to inquire at a Internet Location Service (ILS) or
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
server, to perform a name lookup. That way it can
use a symbolic alias name to address the client
(phonebook functionality). After the client has deter-
mined the destination address, it proceeds using the
basic H.323 communication mechanisms. Within
Microsoft NetMeeting scenarios the name lookup
process is usually based on an ILS request.
The selected examples show, that the communication
behavior may change significantly each time the scenario
changes. As soon as the resulting control or media traffic
crosses network borders, firewalls have to deal with that
dynamic variety, which is not a trivial task.
3) Network Address Translation (NAT)
Another problem arises when Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT) has to be performed by the firewall. In this
case the internal terminals (Terminal B and C) can not be
called directly from the “outside” networks, because their
address is not visible for an external terminal. This is a
desired firewall function - it hides internal details and
prevents internal systems from being attacked directly. It
conflicts with the usual H.323 protocol flow though.
If, in our scenario (Figure 1), Terminal A wants to con-
nect to Terminal B this could not be done directly. Termi-
nal A has to connect to the firewall first, then Terminal A
has to tell the firewall to whom it wants to talk. The fire-
wall then has to contact Terminal B and must proxy the












Figure 1: IP-Telephony scenario including Firewalls
exist different methods to achieve this goal.
If no gatekeeper is present in the scenario, the follow-
ing method, described in [12] can be used:
• The external terminal has to be modified. There must
be a configuration entryy in which the user can spec-
ify a firewall which will proxy the call.
• The calling party must connect to the remote proxy,
and tell that proxy whom it wants to talk with. The
H.323 setup message supports this operation mode.
The destCallSignalingAddress and/or the destina-
tionAddress (alias list) must contain the address of
the proxy. The remoteExtensionAlias field should
contain the information about the actual target user.
The proxy must resolve the name into an IP address.
This could be done by using DNS, LDAP or different
protocols.
• Then, the proxy connects the target and relays the
control/audio streams between both terminals.
If a Gatekeeper is present, the following method is pro-
posed in [13]:
• The gatekeeper in the internal network has to be
installed in parallel to the firewall. It has to be config-
ured with a valid address.
• The external Terminal A has to be configured to use
the gatekeeper.
• If Terminal A wants to initiate a call to Terminal B, it
asks the gatekeeper for permission to call Terminal
B.
• The gatekeeper responds with the address of the fire-
wall to Terminal A.
• Terminal A calls the firewall (or the proxy within the
firewall).
• The proxy consults the gatekeeper for the true desti-
nation which is Terminal B.
• The proxy then complements the call setup and
relays the control/audio streams between both termi-
nals.
In the case, that an internal terminal wants to initiate a
call, the same methods can be used. In addition the fire-
wall can try to handle the call “transparently”. The inter-
nal terminal places the call to the external terminal
directly, because this one has a valid address. The firewall
has to monitor and remember the communication state
and has to map all internal IP addresses (for internal ter-
minals) to addresses that are valid externally (as e.g. the
address of the firewall itself).
We expect both parties (calling party and called party)
to be behind their own company firewall in most practical
scenarios. Therefore the incoming call problem is a gen-
eral and very important one. As shown above, all avail-
able solutions, to handle incoming calls in NAT
environments require an interaction between the firewall/
proxy and the components that perform address resolu-
tion. The name resolution could be performed by H.323
components (e.g. a gatekeeper) or by other services (e.g.
DNS, LDAP,...). Therefore a parser component within a
firewall must be able to interoperate with these services.
C.  Parser related problems
The task of traffic observation within the firewall is
performed by a parser. Commonly used firewalls use
static and integrated protocol parsers. These parsers are
often written in a firewall specific language (e.g.
INSPECT in a FIREWALL-1 [14]). Usually they are
compiled in advance and then statically loaded into the
firewall.
They may interact with the firewall, request data
streams for analysis and reconfigure the overall system
based on their inspection results. A system of this type is
shown in Figure 2.
The figure shows a H.323 parser which is directly
embedded (as other parsers for other protocols may be
too) in the firewall (FW) itself. The firewall relies on and
uses functions of the Operating System (OS) of the fire-
wall host. IP-Telephony data streams are passed to the
firewall components (e.g. by configuring OS specific
sockets / packet filters) and the parser within the firewall
is responsible for analyzing them. In this paper we will
generally use this kind of basic schematics for explaining
and comparing the differences between various architec-
tures.
A “parser as integral part of the firewall” approach
works very well with common applications, but with IP-
Telephony applications it does not. The following rea-
sons cause this fact:
1 Different communication mechanisms:
Obviously, different parsers are necessary for every
type of H.323 scenario. If the scenario is changed
only slightly, the parser can often not be adjusted to
the new requirements and a new parser becomes nec-
essary. Our practical evaluation shows, that static and
embedded parsers are not able to adapt to the
described complex scenarios.
2 Network Address Translation (NAT):
The parser can only communicate with the firewall,
but not with other components. As shown, a connec-
tion to other components is necessary to successfully
OS
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Figure 2: Integrated protocol parser
enable the use of NAT.
III. EVALUATION OF CURRENT SOLUTIONS
A “conventional” firewall/parser architecture, as shown
in Figure 2, is obviously not sufficient to support IP-Tele-
phony scenarios. This fact has been recognized by vari-
ous firewall vendors and has lead to implementations
cope with the problems. The first example describes the
H.323 solution of the firewall market leader (80% of the
market). The two other examples show dedicated solu-
tions, which explicitly address the described problems.
A.  Firewall-1
The architecture of the Firewall-1 [14] product basi-
cally corresponds to the architecture shown in Figure 2.
Therefore all problems described above occur in a Fire-
wall-1 protected network. Because the parser is static, a
dedicated parser is necessary for each communication
scenario. Currently two parsers are available, one for
Microsoft Netmeeting and another generic one for H.323
traffic. We tested these parsers with the following results:
• The Netmeeting parser supports the direct connec-
tion between two Netmeeting (version 2 and version
3) terminals only. If one of the terminals is replaced
by another product (in our experiment a H.323 com-
pliant Innovaphone IP400 [16]), the parser does not
work correctly and the intended connection setup is
blocked by the firewall.
• The generic parser did not work at all. Almost no
documentation is available for this parser, so the rea-
sons for its failing could not be inspected in detail,
nor could it be reconfigured correctly.
• NAT scenarios are not fully supported. There is no
mechanism to handle incoming external calls in a
NAT network configuration mode.
Summary:
The parser components are very static. Only some
basic scenarios with standard applications could be run
successfully in our experiments. Because of the missing
interaction between the firewall and the parser compo-
nents, inherently not all address translation scenarios can
be supported.
B.  Cisco MCM
The Cisco Multimedia Conference Manager (MCM)
[13] provides both gatekeeper and proxy functionality. It
forms an additional system which can be used to extend
existing firewalls with IP-Telephony functionality. The
MCM can be installed on a Cisco System (e.g. router
using Cisco IOS), in parallel to or behind a firewall. Its
architecture is shown in Figure 3.
All IP-Telephony traffic is handled by the MCN and
thereby “bypasses” the original firewall. An interaction
between the firewall and the MCM is not intended. If the
MCM is used parallel to the firewall, NAT scenarios can
be supported. This is possible, because the MCM con-
sists of a gatekeeper and a proxy which are able to inter-
act.
Summary:
The approach basically addresses the NAT problem.
All possible NAT scenarios could be supported. The
parser within the proxy part of the MCM is also static.
The parser component can not be adapted to dedicated
scenarios and applications. Interaction with a gatekeeper
is possible, interaction with other components like ILS or
DNS is not used.
C.  Phonepatch
The PhonePatch [15] component focuses on a Net-
Meeting scenario and works like a proxy with some addi-
tional functionality (PBX like functions, e.g. callback).
PhonePatch is used in parallel to an existing firewall and
is explicitly responsible for handling the IP-Telephony
traffic. An interaction between the firewall and Phone-
Patch is not implemented.
All Internet Location Service (ILS) requests are passed
through PhonePatch. This allows to examine the IP
addresses transfered as part of the ILS protocol and
adjust them to redirect the call from its original destina-
tion to the PhonePatch host. When data streams then
arrive, the PhonePatch component directs them to the
host that was mentioned in the original ILS request. This
transparently fools NetMeeting applications into making
a “proxy call”, even though the application configuration
does not have to support proxies explicitly (Netmeeting












Version 3 supports using proxies for outgoing calls now).
Summary:
This approach basically addresses scenarios using Net-
Meeting terminals using ILS in NAT environments.
Varying protocol scenarios and generic H.323 applica-
tions are not targeted and could not be supported in our
experiments using other H.323 systems (e.g. Innova-
Phone).
IV. OUR NEW EXTENDED APPROACH
As we have shown, a commonly used internal firewall
architecture as shown in Figure 2 is not very useful for
IP-Telephony scenarios. Various vendors recognized this
and implemented / proposed other architectures. These -
up to now - may handle parts of the described problem
domain. A general solution for all of the problems is not
available yet. That is why we introduce a new parser
architecture (Figure 5) which is explicitly targeted to be
more general.
We decide to place the parser outside the conventional
firewall core.
• This allows the parser component to communicate
with other (e.g. IP-Telephony) components. As a
consequence all relevant NAT scenarios can be sup-
ported.
• Additionally the parser component can be loaded
dynamically and configured separately (e.g. with an
optimized / dedicated configuration language) from
the firewall. This enables a general and still light-
weight support for dedicated and even changing or
emerging scenarios and components.
These design considerations directly influence our archi-
tectural and implementation strategy.
To be able to move the parser out of the firewall core,
an interface is necessary. It allows the parser to interact
with the firewall system as it did before when it was an
integral part of it.
• An adaption layer is used, to allow the reuse of the
parser when the firewall type/vendor is changed. The
so called “Firewall Adaption Layer” is responsible
for mapping the generic firewall commands gener-
ated by a specific (e.g. IP-Telephony) parser to com-
mands that are understandable for a specific (and
thereby enhanced) firewall. As an example, generic
commands are used to inform the firewall, which
connections are negotiated and should be passed
through or redirected to a specific filter.
• We use a so called “Data Adaption Layer” which is
responsible for redirecting the data streams to the
parser. This layer allows to modify the internal
source of the observable and modifiable data.
• We use a dedicated adaption layer for communicat-
ing with external components. In our scenario it is
called “IP-Telephony Adaption Layer”. The parser
can generate generic requests and the adaption layer
is able to map these request to the protocol language
of a special component. This for example allows to
map a parser request like “determine the destination
address for a call to user steinmetz” to a specific
DNS, LDAP and/or Gatekeeper request.
A variety of additional benefits directly results from this
architecture:
• Not only can the parser be easily adapted to dedi-
cated H.323 scenarios. It may also be changed for
scenarios which use a different IP-Telephony signal-
ing protocol. Support for SIP scenarios or heteroge-
nous scenarios can be implemented by just
modifying the IP-Telephony parser.
• As our current implementation shows, by extending
the FW Adaption Layer, the parser can support dif-
ferent firewalls and firewall systems. The parser must
not be rewritten from scratch, if ported to another
system.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper we have shown that and why the usage of
firewalls leads to problems within IP-Telephony scena-
rios. We analyzed available firewall products and showed
that they do not fully support all relevant IP-Telephony
needs. To allow the unrestricted use of IP-Telephony
applications within firewall environments we propose a
new architecture. This one is currently evaluated as part
of an experimental prototype implementation.
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